Breaking the tyranny of extremists

Political scientist Lawrence R. Jacobs argues that the U.S. presidential nomination system has been captured by small, ideologically driven primary electorates and that this, combined with the expansion of unilateral presidential powers, risks enabling populist demagogues. He calls for urgent reforms—most immediately within the Republican Party—to restore the independence of a portion of convention delegates so party leaders can block candidates deemed threats to the rule of law.

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Why It Matters

Jacobs frames the nomination changes as undermining constitutional checks designed to filter presidential candidates and says restoring a limited role for unpledged delegates is necessary to prevent future presidents who might disregard the rule of law. The proposal touches on both party governance and the balance of executive power, with implications for future elections and democratic norms.

Key Facts

Author: Lawrence R. Jacobs, Walter F. and Joan Mondale Chair for Political Studies, University of Minnesota
Primary delegate change: Share of unpledged Republican delegates fell from nearly 20% (pre-2012) to 6.9% by 2016
2016 nomination contest: Donald Trump won early primary contests with under 40% support in a crowded field
Republican primary electorate in 2016: About 75% of Republican primary voters identified as very or somewhat conservative
2016 general electorate: About two-thirds of general-election voters described themselves as moderate or liberal

Lawrence R. Jacobs says the modern presidential nomination process has shifted power toward relatively small, ideologically driven segments of voters, allowing activists to propel candidates who may lack commitment to the rule of law and constitutional norms. He traces this change to post-1970s nomination reforms that increased the influence of direct primaries and lowered turnout, enabling blocs such as evangelicals and hardline opponents of immigration and abortion to shape delegate slates. Jacobs argues this shift has eroded the Constitution’s intended “filter” for executive leadership—what the Framers hoped would produce presidents of ability and virtue and prevent demagogues. He points to Donald Trump’s 2016 nomination as emblematic: Trump secured the nomination by winning pluralities in conservative primary electorates while polling estimates showed a general-election majority describing themselves as moderate or liberal. A second concern Jacobs raises is the expansion of unilateral presidential powers since the Cold War, which has placed enormous authority in the Oval Office. He contends that this accumulation of power, combined with weakened informal vetting by party institutions, leaves the country vulnerable if a nominee is willing to flout legal and constitutional constraints. To address the problem, Jacobs urges immediate reforms to the nomination process, with particular emphasis on restoring and expanding the independence of unpledged Republican delegates—national and state party leaders who, until 2012, comprised nearly a fifth of convention delegates. He proposes maintaining primaries as the central mechanism for candidate selection while giving party leaders a narrowly defined off-ramp to prevent activists from elevating candidates who threaten constitutional governance. Jacobs acknowledges that ideologues will portray such reforms as anti-democratic, but he argues the measures would preserve the dominant role of primary voters while providing a safeguard against candidates judged dangerous to the rule of law. He warns that without timely action, the party risks nominating another vengeful or unprincipled candidate in future cycles, citing 2028 as a possible risk horizon.