Former top US diplomat reveals mistakes made after 9/11 attacks
Nearly 25 years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, former US diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad told Al Jazeera he has second thoughts about key US decisions that followed, saying fear and anger shaped a sequence of choices that had long-term consequences. He singled out the refusal to negotiate with the Taliban in 2001 and flawed intelligence about Iraqi weapons as notable errors.

Why It Matters
Khalilzad served on the National Security Council at the time of 9/11 and later represented the US in Afghanistan, Iraq and at the UN, so his reassessment speaks to decisions that led to nearly two decades of war in Afghanistan, a separate campaign in Iraq, and a contentious US military withdrawal — outcomes that reshaped US foreign policy and regional stability.
Key Facts
- Event: September 11, 2001 attacks — nearly 3,000 people killed
- Timing of reflections: Interview given on Friday for Al Jazeera programme This is America, described as 25 years after the attacks
- Khalilzad roles: Senior director on the US National Security Council in 2001; later US ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations
- Afghanistan invasion: US launched an invasion less than a month after 9/11; the conflict lasted nearly 20 years
- Taliban negotiations: Reports indicate the Taliban may have been willing to negotiate in 2001; Khalilzad said the US decided not to negotiate and later said including the Taliban might have been helpful.
Former US official Zalmay Khalilzad told Al Jazeera that in the wake of the September 11 attacks a climate of fear and anger helped drive rapid, consequential decisions. Speaking 25 years after the attacks, Khalilzad, who was a senior National Security Council director at the time and later served as US ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations, said policymakers were motivated by urgency and concern about additional attacks. Khalilzad said one major regret concerns the early handling of Afghanistan. He recounted that the US, in the immediate aftermath, prioritized hunting al-Qaeda members and gathering intelligence rather than exploring talks with the Taliban, which then controlled Afghanistan. He acknowledged reports that the Taliban may have been open to a deal in 2001 and said, in hindsight, integrating the movement into a political settlement might have been beneficial. On the Iraq campaign that began in 2003, Khalilzad pointed to serious information problems. The US justification for toppling Saddam Hussein relied on intelligence assessments about weapons of mass destruction that were later shown to be false. He suggested that the post-9/11 environment — and fears of another unexpected attack — helped push US policy from containment to regime overthrow. Khalilzad also addressed the end of the US military presence in Afghanistan. He said he supported withdrawing troops after two decades, arguing the terrorist threat that had driven the intervention had been greatly reduced and the conflict risked continuing indefinitely. He acknowledged the withdrawal, completed in 2021 following a 2020 agreement to pull out forces, drew sharp criticism for its execution and for leaving at-risk Afghans behind. Khalilzad noted that the Taliban’s return to power has coincided with what he described as a diminished terrorism threat to US interests.
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Original source: Al Jazeera