The World Is Entering a New Era of Energy Security
The U.S.–Iran and Russia–Ukraine conflicts have revealed systemic weaknesses in the global energy system, linking energy security to financial, transportation, military, and strategic considerations. Disruptions to Russian pipeline gas and to oil and LNG flows through strategic maritime chokepoints have accelerated moves toward diversification and greater strategic autonomy by states.
Why It Matters
These crises illustrate that energy supply risks now propagate through shipping routes, insurance, finance and geopolitics, meaning countries must reassess dependencies and resilience across multiple sectors rather than treating energy as separable from broader national-security concerns.
Key Facts
- IEA assessment of Strait of Hormuz disruption: About 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and refined products were affected when the Strait was effectively closed (described as the largest oil-supply disruption in IEA history).
- EU Russian gas share (2018–21): Russian gas supplied more than 40% of EU gas demand during 2018–21.
- U.S. LNG share of EU imports: U.S. share of EU LNG imports rose from roughly 29% in 2021 to 53% in 2025.
- U.S. share of global LNG exports (2025): The United States supplied about 26% of global LNG exports in 2025; the IEA expects this could approach one-third by decade's end.
- U.S. LNG exports to China (2024–25): U.S. LNG exports to China fell from about 0.6 Bcf/d in 2024 to zero in 2025.
The recent conflicts involving Iran, Russia and Ukraine have exposed multiple fault lines in the global energy system, showing that energy security is intertwined with finance, transport, military posture and geopolitical alignments. Europe’s heavy reliance on Russian pipeline gas before 2022 and the vulnerability of oil and LNG traffic through chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz have both produced major supply shocks with global ramifications. The International Energy Agency called the Strait-of-Hormuz disruption the largest oil-supply interruption in its history, with roughly 20 million barrels per day of crude and products affected when the waterway was effectively closed. European dependence on Russian pipeline gas peaked in the late 2010s, with Russia supplying more than 40% of the bloc’s gas demand in 2018–21. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Europe has sharply reduced that pipeline exposure, shifting toward liquefied natural gas imports and a broader array of suppliers. U.S. LNG gained prominence: its share of EU LNG imports increased from about 29% in 2021 to 53% in 2025, and the U.S. accounted for roughly 26% of global LNG exports in 2025. While this diversification reduced reliance on a single supplier, it has tied Europe more closely to global LNG markets, shipping capacity and international pricing dynamics. China’s exposure looks different. Direct energy imports from the United States have declined—U.S. LNG exports to China fell from about 0.6 billion cubic feet per day in 2024 to zero in 2025—as Beijing expanded pipeline ties with Russia and Central Asia, boosted domestic output, added strategic reserves, and accelerated renewables and electrification. Nevertheless, China remains vulnerable to maritime chokepoints and the broader interconnectedness of global supply chains, insurance markets and technology links. Taken together, the pieces point toward a new phase of globalization in which countries seek greater strategic autonomy rather than full autarky. Policymakers are likely to emphasize diversified suppliers, alternative transport routes, domestic capacity (including renewables and nuclear where appropriate), storage and resilience measures, and recalibrated strategic relationships with major powers to reduce exposure to concentrated risks in energy and adjacent systems.