Uzbekistan Scales Back Nuclear Cooperation With Russia

Uzbekistan's commitment to Russian-led nuclear development has cooled dramatically just months after President Mirziyoyev and Vladimir Putin jointly inaugurated the country's first nuclear power project in June. The original arrangement placed Rosatom, Russia's state nuclear corporation, in the lead role for constructing two large reactors and supporting infrastructure in what was presented as a flagship energy initiative. However, a September 2 presidential statement announcing the formation of an international engineering consortium conspicuously omitted any mention of Rosatom, signaling a fundamental shift in Tashkent's approach.

The deterioration appears rooted in multiple grievances, with financing representing the primary friction point. Russia proposed at least one funding arrangement that Uzbek officials rejected, leaving the $9.5 billion project's financial structure uncertain. Beyond cost concerns, Mirziyoyev has expressed dissatisfaction with the limited role allocated to Uzbek enterprises and workers. The current plan assigns only 21 percent of the project value—roughly $1.9 billion—to domestic contractors, a figure the president deemed insufficient. His administration now aims to increase local production to at least 30 percent and ensure Uzbek firms conduct 65 percent of construction work, while employing 7,000 local specialists.

Tension in the bilateral relationship extends beyond nuclear cooperation. Construction timelines have slipped, with a launch originally scheduled for March 2024 postponed until January 2026. Additionally, Mirziyoyev announced plans for a second nuclear facility in August without clarifying construction details or identifying a builder, leaving open the possibility of engaging alternative partners. The vagueness surrounding this expansion project reflects Tashkent's apparent desire to maintain flexibility.

Parallel diplomatic overtures toward the United States underscore Uzbekistan's diversification strategy. Within a four-day span in early September, Mirziyoyev met twice with American officials, including a retiring U.S. senator and Trump administration representatives focused on small modular reactor development in Central Asia. These engagements suggest Washington views the region as strategically important for nuclear energy cooperation and may offer Tashkent an alternative to Russian-dependent infrastructure projects.

Mirziyoyev's moves reflect a broader recalibration of Central Asian geopolitical alignments. While the exact composition and operational role of the proposed international consortium remain undefined, the deliberate sidelining of Rosatom signals that Uzbekistan intends to assert greater control over its energy infrastructure development and reduce dependence on Moscow's technical and financial dominance in the nuclear sector.