BRICS summit may be the only place another Iran ceasefire can be built

The military escalation between Iran and the United States has created an opening for a different kind of diplomatic intervention. While Western observers dismissed the upcoming BRICS summit as merely a photo opportunity, the historical record suggests otherwise. Over the past six months, every functional ceasefire agreement has emerged from negotiations involving BRICS members—most notably China, which initiated the first ceasefire proposal in late March, and Pakistan, which hosted direct talks between American and Iranian delegations at the highest level seen during this conflict.

China's position as a broker is particularly distinctive. Unlike Washington, Beijing maintains substantial economic relationships with both Iran and the Gulf states, creating mutual incentive for de-escalation. China absorbs over 80 percent of Iran's crude exports while also importing heavily from Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and other Gulf producers now under Iranian fire. This dual exposure means Beijing loses money on both sides of the confrontation—a painful leverage that translates into credibility when proposing compromise. While China has supplied Iran with military-related technology and remained largely silent on civilian casualties from Iranian strikes, its commercial interests in regional stability prove more effective than ideological conviction in producing signed agreements.

The previous ceasefire framework, the Islamabad Memorandum signed in June, demonstrated what BRICS-centered diplomacy could achieve: a fourteen-point agreement including sixty days of toll-free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, pledges to lift naval blockades, and plans for $300 billion in reconstruction. Though that agreement collapsed when signatories interpreted key articles differently, the machinery that assembled it survived. Pakistan, Qatar, Oman, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt all remain active participants, and most of these players will physically sit together in Delhi on September 12.

Beyond immediate ceasefire prospects, the summit represents a broader shift in how economically excluded nations are organizing alternatives to dollar-dependent payment systems. Iran's exclusion from dollar infrastructure—a policy also applied to Russia, Venezuela, and Afghanistan—has accelerated adoption of alternative payment channels including China's CIPS system and India's proposed links between member nations' fast-payment infrastructure. While these alternatives remain dwarfed by SWIFT's global dominance, governments across the Global South are now calculating the risk of dependency on American-controlled financial rails after witnessing Iran bombed while unable to sell oil to willing buyers.

The fundamental challenge for any Delhi text will be addressing the interests of the nations absorbing the real costs of this conflict. Kuwait has endured strikes on its airport, refineries, and military bases. Oman designed compromise shipping routes. Qatar maintained diplomatic channels despite being hit itself. These Gulf states are not peripheral actors to be arranged around Chinese or Russian negotiating positions—they are essential participants whose security concerns must be genuinely resolved for any agreement to survive beyond the signing ceremony.