How 9/11 helped Israel sell its war on Palestinians to America
A Palestinian American recounts how the September 11, 2001 attacks and the ensuing US “war on terror” allowed Israeli leaders and allies to reframe Israeli actions toward Palestinians as part of a common counterterrorism struggle with the United States. That narrative, the author argues, helped normalize intelligence cooperation, legal and financial support for Israel, and the export of Israeli security practices to US operations abroad.
Why It Matters
The shift from a Cold War framing to a post-9/11 counterterrorism paradigm reshaped US-Israel relations, according to the author: it aligned political sympathies, expanded cooperation and funding, and helped cast Palestinian resistance as a security threat—affecting policy, public perception, and the rights of Palestinians and Muslim Americans.
Key Facts
- Author background: Palestinian American who grew up across the Hudson River from Manhattan
- Last visit to World Trade Center: Final tour to the WTC observation deck in late August 2001
- Date of attacks: September 11, 2001
- Immediate death toll: Nearly 3,000 people killed
- Benjamin Netanyahu comment: Told The New York Times the attack would 'generate immediate sympathy' and 'strengthen the bond between our two peoples' (initially said 'It's very good' then edited himself)
The author, a Palestinian American who grew up within sight of Manhattan, recalls taking relatives on a final sightseeing trip to the World Trade Center observation deck in late August 2001. Two weeks later the towers collapsed in the September 11 attacks; the author watched the unfolding horror from a New England college dormitory and immediately perceived that the event would complicate life in the United States for Palestinians.
Before 9/11, US–Israel ties were shaped largely by the Cold War; Israel positioned itself as a US-aligned democracy in a region where many Arab states had Soviet ties. With the Cold War’s end, that alignment became harder to sustain as global politics shifted, and Washington at times used its leverage to press Israel on settlement activity and supported flawed peacemaking efforts.
The attacks and the global “war on terror” that followed offered a new shared framework. With the second Palestinian Intifada already under way, the United States’ focus on Islamist militancy created political space for Israeli leaders and their American allies to recast Israeli security measures as part of a broader counterterrorism effort. The author points to Benjamin Netanyahu’s near-immediate public reaction—saying the attacks would generate sympathy and strengthen ties—as emblematic of how Israeli figures saw an opening.
Over time, this reframing had concrete effects: intelligence ties between Washington and Jerusalem deepened, US financial backing for Israel increased, and some US legislative measures adopted expanded counterterrorism authorities that were used against Palestinians. The discourse also shifted public perceptions—Palestinian resistance could be presented as a security problem rather than a response to occupation, critics of Israel risked being labeled extremist, and Muslim Americans faced stigmatizing narratives. Practices developed by Israel—surveillance, counterinsurgency and targeted killings—were cited and adapted in US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The author cites prominent American commentators who helped popularize these Islamophobic or threat-based depictions, including David Horowitz, Daniel Pipes, Steven Emerson, Brigitte Gabriel and David Yerushalmi.
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